 The recent up tick in terrorist threats to commercial aviation combined with a complete lack of progress in security improvements is a cause for marked concern as the five year anniversary of 9/11 draws nearer.
The threat we face, and our lack of preparedness is best understood by following a simple logic flow – In 2006,
Terrorists are still actively seeking to hijack commercial airliners –
- This is exactly the warning broadcast by the 9/11 Commission and the FBI
- In January 2006, Osama Bin Laden released a tape promising new terror attacks on the U.S.
- This tape followed a similar one released by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
- The Bush Administration has now confirmed the existence of another 9/11 attack planned against a building in Los Angeles after September 11, 2001.
- The results of a Homeland Security investigation into a possible 9/11 “dry run” by a group of Syrian nationals last year aboard a Northwest Airlines jet were released in late April 2006. The report was immediately classified by TSA.
- FBI recently warned the Federal Air Marshal Service an Al Qaeda sympathizer had stated he developed plans to overcome air marshals aboard commercial airliners by watching a newsmagazine piece in which federal air marshal managers revealed sensitive operational procedures over the objections of their field agents
Our $12 Billion airline security system will not stop them –
- Government’s testers report airport security fails to detect hidden weapons more than 75% of the time. Two years ago, a high school student planted fake weapons on four airliners. He was successful every time he tried.
- Testing results have now been classified to keep them from the public. Congressman Mica (R-FL), however, has seen them and said, the results on weapons were “bad enough,” but the results on explosives “were absolutely horrendous!”
- An entire class of composite (plastic) weapons and explosives cannot be detected at all by present technology
- Screeners at every one of 21 airports tested in May 2006, failed to detect hidden bomb-making materials at security checkpoints. This is a 100% failure rate.
- DHS has tasked multiple full time agents at major airports to investigate widespread internal theft and transit in contraband. 87 TSA screeners have been arrested for theft, and rings of baggage handlers charged with smuggling guns and drugs into airports.
- Hundreds of airports have been evacuated since 9/11 due to screening failures that allowed potential weapons through.
- A very large percentage of checked baggage and air freight is still not physically screened for explosives.
- Multiple GAO reports conclude failures in airport security are rampant
- The government’s terrorist watch lists placed Senator Edward Kennedy and Cat Stevens on a list, but not Osama Bin Laden
Once terrorists are on board, nine out of ten airliners they target will be defenseless –
- The Los Angeles Times recently reported only 2-3% of commercial airline flights are protected by air marshals, despite an annual budget of $688 million per year. Other media reports the numbers at 5-6%. The vast majority of airliners are still completely defenseless against terrorists.
- There are an estimated 2000 full-time air marshals in the U.S, working in teams of at least two. There are 11,000,000 flights per year in the U.S. Air marshals will never be deployed on a significant number of flights.
- Protecting 5% of our flights with air marshals costs almost $700M per year. Protecting 98% of our flights using pilots trained to fly armed (Federal Flight Deck Officers) would cost $30M per year because Federal Flight Deck Officers are not compensated.
- Using armed pilots is 95% cheaper than using air marshals ($30M vs. $700M per year), yet only a small fraction of flights are protected by armed pilots because the vast majority of previously enthusiastic pilots now refuse to participate, citing a prejudiced TSA applications process and dangerous operations protocols not used for air marshals or other armed officers. Pilots also cite a lack of internal TSA and airline support for the program and TSA interference with their applications.
- Without making the armed pilots program palatable for pilots by simply standardizing it, significant numbers will never be deployed.
- Fortified cockpit doors have been installed on airliners, but are routinely opened for bathroom breaks, meal service, etc., allowing a ready terrorist easy cockpit access. These doors have been breached three times since 9/11, each time by rank amateurs. A transatlantic airliner may be hours away from land, providing terrorists ample time to breach the door. Once terrorists lock themselves in the cockpit, even passengers will be helpless to breach the door and stop them.
The result will be another successful 9/11 attack, or the military shootdown of an innocent airliner –
- The military is actively training to shoot down hijacked commercial airliners
- There may or may not be sufficient time for fighters to intercept a hijacked airliner before it is crashed into a ground target
- A fighter jet’s missile will have an accuracy of 100% against a defenseless airliner
Hollow government assurances expressing confidence in our “multilayered airline security system” are simply not supported by fact. Instead, the facts reveal we have spent $12B on the illusion of airline security.
There is only one way to truly secure an air transportation system the size of that in the U.S. against the threat of terrorist hijacking. It is to protect the eight foot space that is the cockpit from being commandeered – with tens of thousands of volunteer pilots – cross trained as armed federal officers and treated as a critical resource in airline security, flight attendants trained to recognize terrorist behavior and respond to it, fortified cockpit doors that resist being breached by terrorists or explosives, and a more realistic, behavioral profiling system at airport checkpoints that doesn’t waste critical resources intrusively screening passengers and crew who are very unlikely threats.
In an era of competing fiscal and operational priorities, we need realistic solutions that take advantage of every resource available, and policymakers who embrace real solutions, instead of their appearance, taking their cues from frontline operators, not government bureaucrats. To contemplate shooting down a commercial airliner without having used every single resource to prevent it from becoming necessary is criminal.
If we aren’t able to find our footing soon, the logic trail above will become the record of a real event – and the terrorist clock is ticking.
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